We revisit the problem of distributed approximation of functions over multiple-access channels. Contrary to previous works, however, we do not consider the approximation problem itself, but instead we propose a method of incorporating security constraints into a class of approximation schemes to protect against passive eavesdropping. We specifically consider a scenario in which the jamming signal is stronger for the legitimate receiver than it is for the eavesdropper, and we show that in this case jamming techniques are feasible in the sense that they can deteriorate the eavesdropper's signal while not affecting the usefulness of the legitimate receiver's signal. Key ingredients for our scheme are channel resolvability as well as a newly proven result for coding for compound channels with continuous alphabets which is more general than similar results from prior works and may thus be of independent interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many envisioned 5G applications involve wireless sensor networks with thousands of nodes. In such large-scale networks, efficient use of wireless channel resources is vital. A class of applications with a huge potential for efficiency gains over currently deployed schemes is when the receiver requires only a function of values available at many transmitters in a distributed fashion, a concept originally introduced in [13] . In [14] , [11] , this idea was adapted to a setting where the domain and range of the function to be computed are continuous and the receiver can deal with a noisy estimate of the objective function value. In [3] , we revisited this idea, adapted the existing scheme and provided a thorough analysis of the estimation error in a very general, fast-fading setting.
In some of the foreseen scenarios, such as e-health or industrial applications, security and privacy are expected to be major concerns in addition to efficient resource usage. Information theoretic secrecy can complement classic cryptography in addressing these issues. A natural way to enhance security in a setting such as in [3] is to add a jammer to the system that deteriorates the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the eavesdropper and thereby prevents it from reconstructing a low-noise estimate of the objective function. In this case, it is necessary to place the jammer so that its signal is significantly stronger at the eavesdropper than it is at the legitimate receiver. Since in general, the exact position of an eavesdropper is not known, jammers typically have to be placed at multiple locations. In this work, we propose to turn this situation around and place the jammer so that its signal is stronger at the legitimate receiver than it is at the eavesdropper. Such a setup is often easier to realize since the jammer can for instance be set up in proximity to the legitimate receiver and in certain settings, such as factory buildings, it may be feasible to assume that the attacker is located, e.g., outside of the building while the legitimate receiver and the transmitters are inside. Our proposed scheme exploits the assumption that the jammer's signal is stronger at the legitimate receiver than it is at the eavesdropper. With that, it ensures that the eavesdropper observes a signal very similar to one jammed by white noise, while allowing the legitimate receiver to reconstruct the exact jamming sequence used and thus cancel it from its own received signal.
We use two information theoretic tools, namely a) coding for the compound channel to ensure that the jamming signal can be reconstructed fully by the legitimate receiver and thus be canceled from the received signal, thereby having no impact on the quality of the objective function estimate and b) channel resolvability to guarantee that the jamming signal is virtually indistinguishable from white noise for the eavesdropper. This virtual indistinguishability is phrased in terms of variational distance between the actually observed distribution and a superposition of the transmitters' signal with white noise from the jammer. The concept is related to the idea of achieving semantic security by means of channel resolvability [2] , [6] , [5] ; however, the comparison here is not with a completely useless distribution and thus requires additional bounds on the usefulness of an ideally jammed signal. A more detailed discussion on the implications of a variational distance based guarantee can be found in Section III-A.
The coding result for the continuous compound channel which we derive may also be of interest as an independent result. The compound channel problem was introduced independently in [7] , [4] , [17] , while first independent results for the capacity expression can be found in [4] , [17] . These works, however, explore mainly the case of finite input and output alphabets. The semicontinuous case in which only the input alphabet is assumed to be finite is briefly touched upon in [17] and studied in more detail in [12] which provides an example showing that the capacity expression from the finite case does not carry over to the semicontinuous case in general. The semicontinuous case was further explored in [18] , [1] . In many cases of practical interest, the capacity expression from the finite case can be generalized to the continuous case in which neither input nor output alphabets are assumed to be finite, as was found in [15] for a class of Gaussian compound channels. In this work, we prove more general sufficient conditions under which this generalization holds. We recover the result from [15] for finite Gaussian channels as a special case.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MAIN RESULTS

A. System Model and Problem Statement
In this work, we consider the system model depicted in Fig. 1 . It can be decomposed into smaller (and more easily analyzed) subsystems by considering only a subset of the depicted terminals at a time.
a) Considering the terminals A 1 , . . . , A K , B: This is the system considered in our previous work [3] , except that in [3] , we considered a fast-fading, additive channel with additive noise. In this study, on the contrary, our channel model is more general in the sense that we consider an arbitrary time-discrete memoryless channel. The rationale, however, is that the results specialize to settings similar to the one in [3] . This part of the system consists of transmitters (A k ) K k=1 each of which holds a message s k ∈ S k and a receiver B which has the objective of estimating f (s 1 , . . . , s K ). To this end, each transmitter A k passes the message through a pre-processor F k independently n times yielding a sequence T n k of channel inputs. These are transmitted through n independent uses of the channel, generating a sequence Y n of channel outputs. The receiver passes this sequence through a post-processor D n which generates an approximationf of f (s 1 , . . . , s K ). As mentioned, in [3] , we presented pre-and post-processors suitable for a particular channel model and a particular class of functions f . The idea is that the pre-processors, the channel and the post-processor work together to mimic the function f , and any approach following this idea will be highly dependent on the particular structure of the channel and f . In this work, we do not consider this part of the system in great detail. Instead, we assume that such a system is already in place and propose an augmentation in order to make it more secure. A property of the system in [3] necessary for our purposes and heavily exploited in this work is that the pre-processing is i.i.d., i.e., each pre-processor F k is a stochastic kernel mapping from S k to T k and an n-fold product F n k of it is used to generate the channel input sequence. b) Considering the terminals A 1 , . . . , A K , J, E: In this setting, we assume that the transmitters A 1 , . . . , A K run a scheme of the kind described under a). Instead of the legitimate receiver, there is now an eavesdropper E. The objective is then to limit the usefulness of the eavesdropper's received signal Z n . To this end, we add a friendly jammer J to the system which transmits, according to a certain strategy, a word X n . In this work, any jamming strategy we consider is induced by a codebook C of words of length n through the rule that the jammer chooses an element of the codebook uniformly at random and transmits it. We use existing results on channel resolvability to derive a bound on the usefulness of the signal Z n received at E. c) Considering the terminals A 1 , . . . , A K , J, B: This is the setting from a) with an additional transmitter J. Here we assume that J uses a jamming strategy induced by a codebook C as described under b) and derive a new result on compound channel coding to argue that for suitable choices of C, B is able to fully reconstruct the jamming signal X n . This enables B to perform a cancellation of the jamming signal before it applies the post-processor D n it would use in setting a). How this cancellation works depends on the particularities of the channel considered, but if, e.g., the jamming signal is simply added to the channel output, it is possible to cancel it entirely by subtracting it from the received signal. So in this case the post-processor would consist of a reconstruction of the jamming signal, the subtraction of this signal from the received one and a post-processing step identical to that from a).
d) Combining settings b) and c):
The goal here is to argue the existence of a codebook C which achieves both of the objectives described under b) and c). To this end, we use a standard random codebook construction: Given a channel input alphabet X , a distribution P on X , a block length n and a rate R, we define the (P, n, R)-ensemble of codebooks as a random experiment in which exp(nR) codewords of length n are drawn randomly and independently according do P for each component of each codeword.
Moreover, we wish to be able to incorporate a cost constraint into our construction. More precisely, we say that an additive cost constraint (c, C) consists of a function c : X → R + 0 and a number C ∈ R + 0 . Given any n, we say that x n ∈ X n satisfies the cost constraint if n j=1 c(x j ) ≤ nC. As long as there is at least one x n ∈ X n which satisfies the cost constraint (c, C), given any codebook C of block length n, we can define an associated cost-constrained codebook C c,C which is generated from C by replacing all codewords that do not satisfy the cost constraint with x n . Obviously, all codewords in a cost-constrained codebook satisfy the cost constraint.
The main result of this work, Theorem 2, formulates conditions under which there are codebooks in the (P, n, R)-ensemble of which the (c, C)-cost constrained versions simultaneously achieve the goals set forth under b) and c).
B. Main Results
A compound channel is a family (W s ) s∈S of memoryless time-discrete point-to-point channels with common input alphabet X and output alphabet Y. The transmitter's channel input is passed through a fixed W s for the entire block length, but the transmitter does not control the choice of s, nor is it governed by a probability distribution. In this work, we assume neither the transmitter nor the receiver knows s.
As mentioned in Section I, the capacity expressions from the finite case [4] , [17] do not carry over to the continuous case in general and we therefore need an additional assumption in order to prove a corresponding result for continuous alphabets.
Definition 1. Given a compound channel (W s ) s∈S with input alphabet X and output alphabet Y, we say that it can be
and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , J} there is s ∈ S such that
where we use D α (·||·) to denote Rényi divergence, with D 1 (·||·) being Kullback-Leibler divergence, and I P,W to denote mutual information of the input and output of the channel W under input distribution P .
The discussion in Section III-B will provide sufficient topological conditions for (δ, J)-approximability and show that an example of channels with this property are fading Gaussian channels. Theorem 1. Let (W s ) s∈S be a compound channel with input alphabet X and output alphabet Y, and let P be a probability distribution on X such that for every δ > 0, there is a J(δ) such that (W s ) s∈S can be (δ, J(δ))-approximated under P . Let
and let C be a random codebook from the (P, n, R)-ensemble. Suppose that the codeword C(m) is transmitted through the channel W s , where neither the transmitter nor the receiver knows s. Then there is a decoder mapping the channel output Y n to a message estimateM and some γ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n,
where E is the event thatM = m.
We say that a cost constraint (c, C) is compatible with an input distribution P if for a random variable X distributed according to P , c(X) has a finite moment generating function in an interval about 0 and C > E P c(X). Corollary 1. In the setting of Theorem 1, and given an additive cost constraint (c, C) compatible with P , there are γ 1 , γ 2 > 0 such that for sufficiently large n,
Proof. The restatement of Theorem 1 in terms of tail probability instead of expectation is an immediate consequence of Markov's inequality. We can incorporate the cost constraint using arguments similar to the ones in [8, Section 3.3] .
We assume a given pre-processing scheme and consider effective channels incorporating both the pre-processing at the transmitters and the physical channel. We denote the legitimate user's effective channel, which is a stochastic kernel mapping from S 1 × · · · × S K × X to Y, by W B and the eavesdropper's effective channel, which is a stochastic kernel mapping from S 1 × · · · × S K × X to Z, by W E . For any channel W , we denote the joint input-output distribution under P and W by Q P,W and the marginal for Y by R P,W .
Theorem 2. Let P be a jammer input distribution. Suppose that for every δ > 0, there is some J(δ) such that the compound channel (W s ) s∈S defined by W (s1,...,sK ) := W B (s 1 , . . . , s K , ·, ·) can be (δ, J(δ))-approximated under P . Suppose further that for all s 1 ∈ S 1 , . . . , s K ∈ S K , the joint input-output distribution of the channel W E (s 1 , . . . , s K , ·, ·) under the input distribution P has a moment-generating function which is finite at some point greater than 0. Let (c, C) be an additive cost constraint compatible with P . Given a number R such that sup s1∈S1,...,sK ∈SK I P,WE (s1,...,sK ,·,·) < R < inf s1∈S1,...,sK ∈SK I P,WB (s1,...,sK ,·,·) ,
there are numbers γ 1 , γ 2 > 0 such that for sufficiently large n, there is a codebook C in the (P, n, R)-ensemble such that under the jamming strategy induced by C c,C , the legitimate receiver B can reconstruct M with an error not exceeding exp(−nγ 1 ), while the eavesdropper's outputR WE (s1,...,sK ,·,·) n ,Cc,C satisfies R WE (s1,...,sK ,·,·) n ,Cc,C − R n P,WE (s1,...,sK ,·,·) TV < exp(−nγ 2 ),
where · TV denotes the total variation norm on signed measures.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN RESULTS
A. Operational Aspects of the Variational Distance
In this subsection, we discuss the implications of (9). Given the jamming strategy induced by a codebook C, the eavesdropper observes the distribution µ :=R WE (s1,...,sK ,·,·) n ,C . If the jammer, on the other hand, were transmitting truly random noise, the eavesdropper would observe the distribution ν := R n P,WE (s1,...,sK ,·,·) . The idea in light of (9) is, therefore, to argue that these distributions are "very close" to each other. Obviously, this distribution given truly random noise still depends on s 1 , . . . , s K , but given a concrete channel model, e.g., an additive white Gaussian noise multiple-access channel, it is possible to lower bound error measures such as tail probabilities or variance at the eavesdropper. We focus here on the discussion of what the attacker gains by observing µ instead of ν, in terms of the left hand side in (9) , which we denote by δ. An immediate consequence of the definition of variational distance is that tail probabilities for the attacker can improve by at most δ, i.e., we have for any estimator g that the attacker can apply to its channel output in order to obtain an estimate of f (s 1 , . . . , s K )
Given a loss function L which assigns a number in [0, L max ] to any pair of estimate and true function value, we can similarly derive
We conclude the discussion with an example. If L : (a, b) → (a − b) 2 is the squared-distance loss, the range of f is contained within an interval of length ∆ and a g is used which confines the estimate to the same interval, then the maximum gain in expected loss from observing µ instead of ν is ∆ 2 δ.
B. Feasibility of Channel Approximation
In this subsection, we provide some tools and examples to argue that many compound channels of practical interest can indeed be (δ, J)-approximated so that Theorem 1 may be applied to them. We begin with an observation that shows how our result specializes to the known results [4] , [17] for channels with finite alphabets. Lemma 4] implies that for every compound channel (W s ) s∈S with finite input and output alphabets and every δ > 0, there is an integer J(δ) such that (W s ) s∈S can be (δ, J(δ))-approximated. (3) and (4) are direct consequences of statement (c) of the lemma, while (1) can be shown to follow from statement (b). Finally, (2) is trivially satisfied for finite alphabets, since Rényi divergence is in this case always finite [16] .
For many channels of interest, (δ, J)-approximability can be shown directly by going through properties (1) through (4). However, it is often easier to make an argument involving topological properties of S. The following lemma provides some machinery to this end. Lemma 1. Let (W s ) s∈S be a compound channel with input alphabet X and output alphabet Y, let P be a probability distribution on X and assume that there is a topology on S such that S is compact and ·) ) is upper semi-continuous at s 0 (11) ∀s 1 , s 2 ∈ S ∃α > 1 ∀x ∈ X : D α (W s1 (x, ·)||W s2 (x, ·)) < ∞ (12) s → I P,Ws is lower semicontinuous.
Then, for any δ > 0, there is J(δ) such that (W s ) s∈S can be (δ, J(δ))-approximated under P .
Proof. Fix some δ > 0. Define for all s ∈ S
Clearly, for any s ∈ S, we have s ∈ A s and (11) and (13) ensure that A s is open. Thus, (A s ) s∈S is an open cover of S and therefore, the compactness of S yields a finite subcover A s1 , . . . , A s J(δ) . We setŴ δ,j := W sj and given any s ∈ S, we choose j such that s ∈ A sj and argue thatŴ δ,j satisfies (1), (2) and (3). To this end, we note that (2) carries over from (12), while (1) and (3) are ensured by the definition of A sj . Finally, (4) is trivially satisfied, concluding the proof.
We now make use of Lemma 1 to prove that a large class of Gaussian fading multiple-input and multiple-output channels can actually be (δ, J(δ))-approximated and thus Theorem 1 can be applied to them. We denote the set of symmetric, positive semidefinite n × n-matrices with Sym n + and the set of symmetric, positive definite n × n-matrices with Sym n ++ . where the channel input X has range R j , the channel output Y has range R i , the entries of the i × j fading matrix H follow the distribution N (µ H , Σ H ) and the additive noise N is independent of H and follows the distribution N (µ N , Σ N ). Let P be a distribution on X and assume that either P is a multivariate Gaussian with positive definite covariance matrix or that the support of P is contained in some compact set. Then, given any δ > 0, there is J(δ) such that (W s ) s∈S can be (δ, J(δ))-approximated under P .
Proof. We show that the conditions of Lemma 1 are met. [10] provides closed-form expressions for Rényi and Kullback-Leibler divergences between multivariate normal distributions. The only fact that we are going to use and which is apparent from these expressions, however, is that the Rényi and Kullback-Leibler divergences between two multivariate normal distributions are finite and continuous in the mean vectors and covariance matrices of the distributions wherever the covariance matrices are positive definite or, equivalently, both distributions are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Σ N ∈ Sym i ++ and therefore, given any x ∈ X , W s (x, ·) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and thus has a positive definite covariance matrix and a density f Ws(x,·) , which implies (12) .
Next, from the well-known closed-form expression of the multivariate normal density, we know that for any x and y, f Ws(x,·) (y) is continuous in s. The boundedness of S implies a uniform upper bound on f Ws(x,·) (y), so we can use the theorem of dominated convergence to argue that the marginal density f RP,W s (y) = E P f Ws(X,·) (y) depends continuously on s for any fixed y. We write
Since the integrand is lower bounded by −1/e, (13) follows as an application of Fatou's lemma. Finally, in order to argue (11) , we distinguish between the two cases in the statement of the theorem. First, suppose that there is a compact subsetX ⊆ X with P (X \X ) = 0. For any fixed s 0 , the map
is continuous, therefore the image of S ×X is compact and hence bounded. We can therefore invoke the theorem of dominated convergence and argue that (11) is satisfied. Now, suppose that P is multivariate Gaussian with positive definite covariance matrix. We write
From our arguments above, given any s, the distribution Q P,Ws is multivariate Gaussian with positive definite covariance matrix, which implies that (11) is satisfied.
IV. PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We first pick parameters δ, ε, β 1 and β 2 in sequence according to the following scheme, where (5) and the previous choices ensure that these intervals are all nonempty.
Fix a sequence (Ŵ δ,j )
j=1 which (δ, J(δ))-approximates (W s ) s∈S . We use a joint typicality decoder, i.e. if there is a unique m such that ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , J(j)} : i P,Ŵ δ,j (C(m); Y n ) ≥ n(I P,Ŵ δ,j − ε), the decoder declares that message m has been sent; otherwise it declares an error (or that message 1 has been sent).
We define error events
and note that E ⊆ E 1 ∪ E 2 and consequently P(E) ≤ P(E 1 ) + P(E 2 ). So we can bound these two errors separately and then combine them. We start with bounding the expectation of the first summand.
= Q n P,Ws i P,Ŵ δ,j (X n ; Y n ) < n(I P,Ŵ δ,j − ε) (21)
< n(I P,Ŵ δ,j + I P,Ws − I P,Ws − ε)
Step (23) is an application of the union bound and (3). Regarding the reordering of the Radon-Nikodym derivatives, we remark that (1) implies W s (x, ·)≪Ŵ δ,j (x, ·) for P -almost all x and that trivially, R P,Ŵ δ,j ≪R P,Ws everywhere except possibly on an R P,Ws -null set. (24) is true as long as α 1 > 1, α 2 > 0 and α 3 < 1, (25) follows by Markov's inequality and (26) by independence of events, the definition of Rényi divergence and some elementary transformations.
From (2), the theorem of monotone convergence and (1), we can conclude that
so, (16) allows us to fix α 1 at a value greater than 1 such that β 1 − E P D α1 W s (X k , ·)||Ŵ δ,j (X k , ·) > 0. D α3 (Q P,Ws ||P R P,Ws ) converges to I P,Ws from below for α 3 ր 1 and so (17) allows us to fix α 3 at a value less than 1 such that D α3 (Q P,Ws ||P R P,Ws ) + ε − I P,Ws − β 1 − β 2 − δ > 0 . For α 2 , we consider the limit α 2 ր 1. Consequently, all of the summands in (26) vanish exponentially with n → ∞.
For the second summand, we have
j=1 X n ×Y n 1 i P,Ŵ δ,j (x n ;y n )≥n I P,Ŵ δ,j −ε P n R n P,Ws (dx n , dy n )
= exp(nR) J(δ) j=1 X n ×Y n exp (−i P,Ws (x n ; y n )) 1 i P,Ŵ δ,j (x n ;y n )≥n I P,Ŵ δ,j −ε Q n P,Ws (dx n , dy n ) (29) = exp(nR) J(δ) j=1 X n ×Y n exp −i P,Ws (x n ; y n ) + i P,Ŵ δ,j (x n ; y n ) − i P,Ŵ δ,j (x n ; y n ) 1 i P,Ŵ δ,j (x n ;y n )≥n I P,Ŵ δ,j −ε Q n P,Ws (dx n , dy n )
exp −n I P,Ŵ δ,j − ε X n ×Y n exp −i P,Ws (x n ; y n ) + i P,Ŵ δ,j (x n ; y n ) Q n P,Ws (dx n , dy n ) (31) 
where the last inequality is due to (4) . We observe that by (15) , inf s∈S I P,Ws − ε − R − δ > 0. Finally, we pick γ ∈ 0, min (α 1 − 1) β 1 − E P D α1 W s (X k , ·)||Ŵ δ,j (X k , ·) , 
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We first recall a result on channel resolvability from [9] that serves as another ingredient in our proof and will be applied in order to guarantee the virtual indistinguishability of the jamming signal from white noise for the eavesdropper. [9] Given a channel W from X to Y, an input distribution P such that the moment-generating function E QP,W exp(t · i P,W (X; Y )) of the information density exists and is finite for some t > 0, and R > I P,W , there exist γ 1 > 0 and γ 2 > 0 such that for large enough block lengths n, the (P, n, R)-ensemble satisfies P C R W,C − Q n P,W TV > exp(−γ 1 n) ≤ exp (− exp (γ 2 n)) ,
whereR W,C is the output distribution of channel W given that a uniformly random codeword from C is transmitted.
Similarly as with the compound channel coding theorem, we can use known methods, e.g., in [8, Section 3.3] , to incorporate an additive cost constraint and argue the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let P be an input distribution on X and (c, C) an additive cost constraint compatible with P . Then the statement of Theorem 4 is valid even if the codebook C is replaced with its associated cost-constrained version C c,C .
We are now ready to put everything together and conclude the proof of our main result.
Proof of Theorem 2. We show that for cost-constrained random codebooks drawn from the (P, n, R)-ensemble, the probability that they do not satisfy the conclusion of the theorem tends to 0 exponentially. An application of Corollary 1 yields γ 1 , β 1 > 0 such that for sufficiently large n, the probability that the reconstruction error is at least exp(nγ 1 ) is less than exp(nβ 1 ). We apply Corollary 2, which yields numbers γ 2 , β 2 > 0 such that the probability that (9) is not satisfied is at most exp(− exp(nβ 2 )). These two facts can be combined using the union bound so that the theorem follows.
